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ABSTRACT:  
Each economic actor is characterized by his own evaluations, traits, and strategies. Although 
heterogeneity  of  economic  actors  is  widely  acknowledged,  little  is  known  about  the  factors 
causing it. In this paper, we will examine the behavioral bias known as myopic loss aversion, and 
the environmental and psychological factors leading to different behavioral reactions. Myopic 
loss aversion has been used to suggest that fund managers should reveal information only rarely, 
to lead investors to choose options with (on average) higher returns.  
Specifically,  we  experimentally  studied  the  impact  of  experience,  individual  differences,  and 
emotions on behavioral responses to feedback frequency in an investment setting. Participants 
made  investment  decisions  in  one  of  three  feedback  frequency  conditions:  (1)  they  received 
feedback after each round and had the opportunity to make investment changes each time; (2) 
they received feedback after each round, but were only given the possibility to make changes 
every three rounds; and (3) they received aggregated feedback every three rounds, and also had 
the opportunity to make changes every three rounds. We collected information about personality 
and individual difference factors before the experiment. Finally, evaluations and emotions were 
measured every three rounds, immediately after feedback was given. 
We  hypothesized  that  myopic  loss  aversion  is  not  a  general  phenomenon,  but  that  stable 
individual differences lead to different evaluations and emotional reactions concerning feedback. 
This implies that myopic loss aversion will only be present for some groups of people under 
certain conditions. As predicted, we found that myopic loss aversion is not generally observed; 
rather, we found both an experience effect and a personality effect. In particular, myopic loss 
aversion was particularly likely: (1) when initial investment rounds lead to negative investment 
experiences (i.e., losses); and (2) for investors with low self-efficacy concerning the investment 
situation.  „Self  efficacy‟  is  related  to  a  personality  profile  characterized  by  confidence  in 
decision-making abilities, high optimism, and low anxiety. Our results may help explain which 
individual and situational factors lead to myopic loss aversion, and should help researchers and 
practitioners provide optimal feedback to different types of investment clients. 
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1. Introduction 
"No two people see the external world in exactly the same 
way.  To every separate person a thing is what he thinks it 
is -- in other words, not a thing, but a think" 
Penelope Fitzgeralde 
 
It is an undisputed reality that each economic actor is characterized by a unique set of 
abilities and characteristics. In the past, these differences were regarded as “interesting” 
due to their role in motivating market interactions and stimulating gains from mutual 
trade.  More recent  research, however,  has  stressed the importance of economic actor 
heterogeneity,  and  some  have  proposed  multi-agent  approaches  to  analyze  models 
involving trait heterogeneity (Axtell, 2007). To make these models optimally predictive, 
we now need to identify the most salient traits and strategies within the population for 
specific economic behaviors.  Examples for heterogeneity in traits concerning economic 
behavior  include:  sophisticated  versus  naive  trading;  and  responders  versus  non-
responders to explain information processing abilities in financial markets (Haltiwanger 
& Waldman, 1985; 1991); sensitivity concerning deviations with respect to others for 
bargaining outcomes (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999); and risk aversion (Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Although  in  some  cases  individual  differences  have  been  identified,  most  economic 
experiments and studies still analyze results at an aggregate level. This might be because 
underlying  heterogeneity  indicators  and  processes  are  difficult  to  understand. 
Consequently, one of the challenges is to identify factors that can explain and predict 
stable individual differences. In this paper, we will present an experimental study that has 
identified individual differences in a financial investment setting, and which shows that 
the origin of these differences can be both situation dependent, environmental factors as 
well as stable, individual differences. 
Researchers in  the  area of  Personality  and Social  Psychology
1  attempt to tease apart 
individual differences and situational factors to explain behaviors within important social 
domains,  and  recently  including  consumer  and  ec onomic  behavior  (De  Cremer, 
Zeelenberg,  &  Murnighan,  2006).  However,  very  few  studies  have  combined 
psychological models with behavioral differences in economic interactions  (Biais et al., 
2005).  Given the  increased interest by economists to use psychologi cal  theories and 
methods that measure neurological (Sanfey et al., 2003), physiological (Ben-Shakhar et 
al.,  2007)  and  biological  ( Kosfeld  et  al.,  2005 )  reactions,  it  is  also   desirable  that 
economists and psychologists work together to determine which psychological measures 
are best suited  to help us  understand economic behaviors. For example, neurological, 
physiological, and biological factors may seem objective; however, they  generally only 
provide rough mean descriptions and correlates of economic behavior, without explaining 
underlying  processes and  causes  (Frijda, 2007).  In addition, both standard economic  
models and  neurological or physiological measures filter out useful intra -  and inter-
individual  variation.  Although  such mean  estimates  are  interesti ng  for  basic model 
building, the inclusion of individual differences should allow us to open up the black box 
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of  decision-making  and  build  more  specific  models  that  take  into  consideration  both 
situation-specific and person-specific information.  
In this paper, we will investigate the behavioral bias of myopic loss aversion, which is 
crucial  for  long-term  investment  decision-making,  and  which  has  been  repeatedly 
observed  in  experimental  studies  (Gneezy  &  Potters,  1997;  Thaler  et  al.,  1997).  We 
predicted and observed strong individual differences that might or might not lead to the 
typically observed reactions for myopic loss aversion. Moreover, we identified individual 
traits that lead to these reactions, and provide insights into the underlying mechanisms of 
myopic loss aversion. Finally, we will show that similar behaviors can be caused by 
environmental  factors.  Taken  together,  our  results  will  allow  us  to  propose  possible 
solutions to diminish the effects of myopic loss aversion. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we will give an overview of 
the existing literature on myopic loss aversion. Section 3 will review the psychological 
literature  concerning  individual  differences,  emotions,  and  evaluations  and  make 
predictions concerning different personality types. Section 4 will present the design and 
procedures of the study. Section 5 will present behavioral results across treatments and 
identify individual differences in evaluations and emotions that could account for them. 
Section 6 will conclude. 
2. Myopic loss aversion 
The fact that investment in stocks is lower than realistic levels of risk aversion would 
predict  (known  as  the  „equity  premium  puzzle‟),  has  been  widely  discussed  in  the 
financial and economic literature (Mehra & Prescott, 1985). Numerous explanations for 
this anomaly have been proposed, one of which is the principle of myopic loss aversion 
(Bernartzi & Thaler, 1995). Myopic loss aversion is based on the principle of (1) loss 
aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Kahneman 1992), due to which losses 
loom larger than gains, and (2) mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 
1985) i.e., a thematic grouping of expenses and gains.  
Risky investment options that show on average high returns are usually characterized by 
short term losses, which will be cancelled out by occasional gains in the long run. An 
overvaluation of losses compared to gains can render such an investment less attractive, 
compared to a safe investment option with lower average returns but less volatility. Less 
frequent feedback might increase the attractiveness of a risky asset by presenting only 
aggregate gains. The effect of feedback from investment and its impact on investment has 
been experimentally studied by economists (Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997) 
and psychologists (Shiv et al., 2005a; 2005b). These studies confirm that investment in 
risky, high return options is higher when aggregate feedback over a number of rounds is 
given (Barron & Erev, 2000; Gneezy & Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997) and that prices 
for such an option will be higher (Gneezy et al., 2003). This bias is not simply due to 
inexperience; professional traders show similar behaviors as non-professionals (Haigh & 
List, 2005). Some have therefore suggested that fund managers should  give portfolio 
performance  information  less  frequently  to  induce  higher  investment  levels;  a PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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recommendation that may have already resulted in information policy changes (Gneezy 
et al., 2003). 
The principle of myopic loss aversion is based on the assumption that losses „feel‟ worse 
than equally sized gains, which points at the importance of emotions for this type of 
decision. Moreover, patients with focal lesions in brain areas related to emotions react 
less strongly to losses and show higher average investment in risky situations than normal 
controls (Shiv et al, 2005a; 2005b). These results suggest that individual differences in 
emotional  reactions  might  influence  investment  choices.  However,  to  date  neither 
individual differences nor emotional reactions in connection with frequent or infrequent 
investment feedback has been explicitly studied. 
The aim of this study is to determine the relation between the display of myopic loss 
aversion and personality. We therefore measured character traits as well as evaluations 
and  emotions  in  an  experimental  investment  game.  An  analysis  of  the  interaction  of 
events  (earnings  and  losses),  emotional  reactions,  and  behaviors  (amount  invested) 
should allow us to identify external circumstances as well as personality factors that are 
likely to lead to myopic loss aversion.  
To make our results easily comparable to the existing experimental literature, we used the 
design proposed by Gneezy and Potters (1997). We also included a third treatment to 
disentangle  feedback  effects  from  investment  flexibility  effects  (cf.  Bellmare  et  al., 
2005). Because behavior can differ significantly when specific parameters are changed 
(Langer & Weber, 2001; 2005), we applied the same probabilities and outcomes as these 
earlier studies. 
3. Evaluations, personality, and decision making 
Contemporary emotion theory suggests that the same situation, such as a monetary win or 
loss, can result in very different emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). This is because 
emotions do not emerge from situations, but rather from the subjective evaluations a 
particular individual ascribes to the situation. For example, a loss will bring about strong 
negative emotions, such as anger, if the person expected to earn a lot and believes that he 
or she “deserves” to earn the money, or if he believes that another agent treated him or 
her  unfairly.  However,  the  same  loss  could  bring  about  mild  irritation  or  even 
indifference if the person believes that the investment was a gamble with only minor 
earning chances. These evaluations are considered a crucial link between situations or 
events and the ensuing emotional and behavioral reactions. Thus, although losses tend to 
lead  to  negative  emotions  and  earnings  to  positive  emotions,  the  specific  emotional 
reaction can be quite varied and will be based on theses subjective evaluations. 
Because evaluations are subjective and inherently personal, it seems logical that stable 
individual difference should systematically influence these evaluations and therefore the 
ensuing emotions (Wranik, 2005). For example, a person who strongly believes in fair 
treatment will be more sensitive to unequal shares or gains. This person will evaluate 
many situations as unfair, and be more likely to feel angry than a person who believes PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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that life in inherently unfair and expects to be treated unfavorably most of the time. Past 
research  has  examined  several  predictions  concerning  which  individual  differences 
should influence which evaluations and found support for this proposition concerning a 
number of factors in various experimental settings (Griner & Smith, 2000; Van Reekum 
& Scherer, 1997; Wranik & Scherer, 2008). Research in workplace settings has referred 
to the fundamental, subconscious conclusions individuals reach about themselves, other 
people, and the world as “core evaluations” (Judge et al., 1998).  
Systematic evaluation biases, such as expectations, beliefs, and attributions, are crucial 
for  the  decision-making  process  in  general  and  should  therefore  play  a  large  role  in 
understanding investment decision-making. Indeed, researchers have identified a range of 
personality  and  emotional  processes  and  variables  that  may  systematically  influence 
investment decisions including self-efficacy, optimism, emotion regulation, impulsivity, 
pessimism, anxiety, and irritation (Ellis, 2002; Hilton, 2001; Salovey, 2001); however, 
there is still very little empirical evidence to determine the impact and importance of 
these variables (for exceptions, see Ameriks et al., 2007 and Wranik et al., 2008). A 
systematic examination of the interaction between individual differences, evaluations and 
emotions in the investment situation is beyond the scope of this paper and is treated in 
more detail in Wranik and Hopfensitz (2008). In this paper, we will focus our discussion 
on the core evaluation that we expected to predict myopic loss aversion; namely, self-
efficacy.  
We will use validated personality scales and evaluation questionnaires to determine if and 
how feedback frequency of investment returns influence individuals with high and low 
self-efficacy. Based on past research, we have defined self-efficacy as a core evaluation 
which includes general optimism, specific confidence in decision-making abilities, and 
lack  of  anxiety  (Judge  et  al.  1998).  In  particular,  optimistic  persons  tend  to  look 
positively into the future and will continue to hope for future earning despite past losses 
(Carver & Scheier, 2002). Similarly, persons who believe in their ability to make good 
decisions  will  try  to  minimize  losses  and  also  look  to  the  future  for  more  earning 
possibilities. This construct is similar to task-specific self-efficacy, which predicts that 
people will persevere in the face of hardship and initial failure in a task (Bandura, 1997). 
Finally, nervous or anxious persons are generally sensitive to uncertainty and therefore 
prefer to avoid risk (Maner & Schmidt. 2006). Taken together, individuals with general 
optimism, specific confidence in decision-making abilities, and lack of anxiety should 
evaluate losses as less negative, report weaker or less negative emotions, and be less 
influenced by feedback frequency (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). They should 
also be future-oriented and present less myopic loss aversion.  
4. Experimental design, procedures and predictions 
To  allow  comparison  with  earlier  results,  our  experiment  was  based  on  the  research 
designs  by  Gneezy  and  Potters  (1997)  and  Bellemare  et  al.  (2005).  In  the  baseline 
treatment, participants faced 15 consecutive investment rounds
2.  Participants received 
100 points for each round, which could be fully or partially invested into one of two 
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options. Earnings from previous rounds could not be used for future investment.
3 One of 
the two investment options was safe ( i.e., every point invested in this option would be 
added to the final earnings), and the other option was risky. The risky option returned the 
invested points multiplied by 3.5 with p=1/3, and returned nothing in 2/3 of the cases. 
Thus, participants could either earn 2.5 times their investment (relative to the points they 
had received at the beginning of the round) or lose their investment. To make losses 
salient,  the instructions and computer interface  clearly stated that participants  had an 
initial amount of capital which they could either keep or invest. The expected value of the 
risky option was therefore larger than the expected value of the safe option.
4 
We compared  the baseline treatment with two treatments based on Bellemare et al. 
(2005). In the baseline treatment, participants had to make a new investment decision in 
each  round  and  received  investment  performance  feedback  after  each  round.  We 
therefore called this treatment High (short for „high feedback‟). In contrast, participants 
in the Low treatment („low feedback‟) were required to fix their investment choice for 
three consecutive rounds and received aggregate feedback about their returns from these 
three rounds. Finally, to disentangle the effects of feedback from those related to the 
opportunity to change the amount invested, we included a third treatment. In this Medium 
treatment, participants again fixed their investment choice for three consecutive rounds; 
however they received feedback every round. Thus, these participants would see if they 
won or lost in each of the 15 rounds, but they could only make a new decision every three 
rounds.   
Since  the  aim  of  our  study  was  to  identify  individual  differences,  evaluations,  and 
emotions  underlying  myopic  loss  aversion,  we  asked  participants  to  respond  to 
questionnaires before and during the task. First, they filled out several questionnaires to 
asses their personality and other individual differences (see Appendix B:5). This was 
done  during  a  separate  one-hour  session,  which  took  place  approximately  one  week 
before  the  experimental  session.  We  thereby  ensured  no  carry-over  effects  from  the 
questionnaires onto the behaviors in the experiment. During the experimental session, we 
measured baseline evaluations and emotions before the first investment round (see Figure 
1).  Then,  every  three  rounds,  after  receiving  feedback  concerning  their  investment, 
subjects  were  asked  to:  (1)  indicate  and  rate  the  most  prominent  emotion  they 
experienced; (2) answer a number of questions concerning evaluations of past and future 
rounds.  
Evaluations reflect an individual‟s subjective evaluation of situations and events, and can 
therefore  only  be  measured  by  self-reports.  Even  though  the  use  of  self-reports  is 
frequently regarded with skepticism by experimental economists, their use is necessary 
whenever  internal,  non-observable  states  are  measured.  Moreover,  studies  employing 
physiological  measures  suggest  the  consistency  and  reliability  of  these  reports  (van 
Reekum et al., 2004).  
                                                 
3 By keeping participants endowment fixed over rounds, we circumvent problems due to differences in 
budget constraints across participants. 
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Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in computer laboratories at the University of Geneva, 
Switzerland. Participants were recruited by announcements promising a monetary reward 
and  were  asked  to  sign  up  for  two  one-hour  sessions.  The  first  was  a  questionnaire 
session; the second was the experimental session in which participants completed the 
investment task. Participants were paid their earnings from the investment task plus a 
show up fee of 10 CHF at the end of the second session. Average earnings were 32 CHF 
(approx. $ 27). In total 114 students (age: M = 24, SD = 5.75; 71 female, 43 male) from a 
variety of fields (psychology, economics, law) participated in the experiment.  
During the first session, participants were informed that they would have to fill out a 
number of questionnaires concerning their personality. It took participants between 40 to 
60 minutes to answer all the questionnaires. To match answers from the two sessions, 
participants also had to provide personal information
5 (i.e., first letter of their father‟s 
name, first letter of their mother‟s name, the day of their birthday, and the month of their 
birthday) which was used to create a personal identifier and which participants had to 
provide again during the second session.  
At  the  beginning  of  the  second  session,  participants  were  informed  that  they  would 
participate  in  an  investment  game  in  which  they  could  earn  points  that  would  be 
converted to real money at a specified exchange rate at the end of the session. They 
received 20 CHF (i.e.,  1500 points) as  initial capital  and were handed the money in 
envelops.  This  money  was  the  capital  that  could  be  used  in  the  15  rounds  of  the 
investment game. In each round, participants made decisions concerning 100 points from 
their initial capital. Points had to be distributed between two options: a safe option and a 
risky option. Investment in the risky option could either result in gains of 2.5 times their 
investment (with probability =1/3) or result in the loss of the invested points. Dependent 
on treatment, participants had  to either make a new decision each round (High) or to fix 
their decision in rounds 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13 for the next three consecutive rounds (Medium 
and Low).  
The Medium and Low treatments differed in how investment outcomes were presented. 
In the Medium treatment, participant saw their gains and loses for every round, and had 
to  press  a  button  to  proceed  from  one  round  to  the  next.  In  the  Low  treatment, 
participants  passed  through  three  consecutive  screens  informing  them  only  about  the 
number  of  the  current  round  (“This  is  round  4”).  They  then  received  information 
concerning aggregate gains or losses over the last three rounds (“In the last three rounds 
you  earned  (lost)  …  points”).  After  participants  had  read  the  instructions  for  their 
treatment, they answered a number of control questions and were invited to address any 
remaining questions to the experimenter.  
To  keep  feedback  comparable  across  treatment,  outcomes  from  investment  were 
predetermined by random sequences that were equally distributed across treatments. 
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Predictions and Hypothesis 
In the  following  section,  we will describe our  hypothesis  and predictions  concerning 
behavior  in  the  investment  task  and  the  anticipated  interactions  of  personality  traits, 
emotions, and behavior. 
Choices:  Expected  value  maximization  predicts  the  selection  of  option  B.  Expected 
utility maximization, however, should lead to the selection of either option A or option B, 
dependent on the individual‟s level of risk aversion. This implies that either everything or 
nothing  should  be  invested.  However,  experiments  of  budget  allocations  across  two 
comparable options have already shown that the majority of participants actually choose 
non extreme investment (Hopfensitz & van Winden, 2008).  
Following  our  previous  discussion  of  myopic  loss  aversion  and  earlier  experimental 
results,  we  expected  to  see  differences  between  treatments  High  and  Low.  Indeed, 
investment is expected to be higher when aggregate feedback is given; however, it is not 
clear if this effect is due to learning or anticipation. Since past research has shown that 
humans are not very good in anticipating their future emotional states (Loewenstein & 
Schkade, 1999), we expected the effect to be only partly due to anticipation. In addition, 
we expected experiences from early rounds to play an important role. How treatment 
Medium  should  affect  investment  behavior  is  less  clear.  If  lack  of  performance 
information and thus protection from potentially negative emotional experiences due to 
losses drives the effects of myopic loss aversion, we would expect Medium to be similar 
to  treatment  High.  If, however, the effect  of  MLA if mainly due to  lack of investor 
flexibility, which in turn reduces overreactions to either gains or losses, we would expect 
Medium to be closer to treatment Low. Earlier experimental studies have shown evidence 
for both possibilities. Bellmare et al (2005) concluded that behavior in Medium is similar 
to High, while Langer and Weber (forthcoming) found the opposite effect. 
We  therefore  have  the  following  hypotheses  concerning  investment  behavior  across 
feedback treatments: 
H1:  Overall  investment  is  higher  with  aggregate  feedback  (High)  than  with  detailed 
feedback and investment flexibility (Low). Allowing for feedback but restricting flexibility 
(Medium) might be sufficient to compensate the effect of myopic loss aversion. 
H2: Humans are limited in their ability to predict future emotional states. We therefore 
expect  myopic  loss  aversion  to  increase  over  time.  In  addition,  participants  who 
encounter many negative events in early rounds and thereby profit from an aggregate 
presentation of earnings, should show stronger myopic loss aversion.  
Emotions: Myopic loss aversion is based on the assumption that losses are experienced 
as worse than the pleasure obtained from equal sized gains, and that aggregate feedback 
reduces the pains from losses. We therefore expect that participants will experience less 
negative emotions in treatment Low compared with treatment High and Medium. We will PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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also test the assumptions, that experiencing negative or positive emotions will predict 
future investment.  
This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
H3: Aggregate feedback will lead to the experience of less negative emotions. Therefore, 
participants in the Low condition will report less negative emotions than participants in 
the High and Medium treatments. 
H4: Differences in experienced emotions are related to behavioral differences. Therefore 
we expect to be able to predict future behavior based on emotional reactions. 
Personality: While the literature has considered myopic loss aversion to be a general 
phenomenon, the aim of this study is to challenge this claim. We therefore hypothesize 
that myopic loss aversion will only be present for individuals with certain personality 
characteristics.  In  this  study,  we  will  focus  on  'self-efficacy',  and  hypothesize  that 
participants exhibiting high self-efficacy will be less vulnerable to myopic loss aversion 
than participants with low self-efficacy. 
H5: Myopic loss aversion is not a general phenomenon but will depend on personality. 
Participants  with  high  self-efficacy  will  get  less  influenced  by  losses  and  feedback 
frequency than those with low self-efficacy. 
We will now turn to the results from our experiment. 
5. Results 
5.1. Investment 
Does behavior in our experiment replicate the observed treatment differences concerning 
low and high feedback from previous experiments? Table 1 and Figure 2 summarize 
investment behavior by treatment for the five blocks of three rounds. Average investment 
across  all  rounds  was:  50.13  (High),  54.20  (Medium)  and  54.87  (Low).  Differences 
across  treatments  were  not  significant  (Mann-Whitney  test
6,  p  >  0.418)  neither  for 
average investment over all rounds, nor for any individual block of three rounds. This 
means that, contrary to previous research, we do not find a general effect of myopic loss 
aversion. Given the strong previous evidence of its existence we will therefore have to 
consider that myopic loss aversion might depend on certain external circumstances or on 
individual  characteristics.  We  will  discuss  these  possibilities  below.  Our  conclusions 
concerning Hypothesis 1 can be summarized as: 
RESULT 1: We observed no overall effect of feedback on investment behavior. Average 
investment is the same in all three treatments. 
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Not only were average investments the same in all three treatments; we also did not 
observe changes over time (see Figure 2: B). Moreover, participants could experience 
more  or  less  frequent  gains  or  losses  in  early  rounds  of  the  experiment.  Since  more 
frequent gains in early rounds might lead to less aversive reactions to frequent feedback, 
we expected that only participants who were initially exposed to frequent losses would 
profit  from  aggregate  feedback  in  future  rounds.  In  our  experiment,  63%  of  the 
participants encountered more than two successive rounds with losses during the first six 
rounds (the first two blocks of our experiment).
7 When we compared future investment 
behavior for these two groups, we observed a striking difference (see Figure 3). While 
participants  that  encountere d  frequent  gains  during  the  first  six  rounds  show ed  no 
differences across feedback conditions, we observed the predicted pattern of myopic loss 
aversion for participants initially facing frequent losses.  
For participants facing initial losses, average investment over rounds 7 to 15 was: High: 
40.3, Medium:  59.8, and Low:  55.5. Tests confirm that investment is higher in the 
Medium and Low treatments compared to High (Mann-Whitney test, p<0.049, for all test 
results see Table 2). For 'lucky' participants, we find no effect (investment rounds 7 to 15: 
High:  72.6,  Medium:  55.7,  Low:  56.9).  Investment  in  High  is  overall  higher  when 
participants were initially lucky (Mann-Whitney, p=0.009), while initial events have no 
impact in the Medium and Low treatments (Mann-Whitney, p>0.386).
8 Similarly, Langer 
and Weber (2001) showed that an aggregate presentation of a gamble is less accepted 
when the gamble is characterized by a small probability of high losses. A repetition of 
such a gamble will result in a large number  of winning rounds (with an occasional high 
loss), which might be similar to our lucky participants. Figure 4 illustrates the shift in the 
investment distribution in treatments Low and High from round 1 to rou nd 15.  Thus, in 
treatment High, investment in the last round is either positively or negatively skewed  
dependent on initial rounds. I n treatment Low,  initial rounds show no effect on the 
distribution in the final round. 
RESULT 2: Participants who initially encountering more than two successive rounds of 
losses,  exhibit  the  behavior  patterns  typically  ascribed  to  myopic  loss  aversion. 
Participants that are “lucky” during the first six rounds, and encounter few losses, show 
no such effect.  
                                                 
7 72 out of 114 participants encountered more than two successive rounds of looses in the first six rounds. 
This ratio was very similar across treatments. For the three treatments 'unlucky' versus 'lucky' participants 
were distributed as follows: High: 24 (unlucky)/14 (lucky); Medium: 22 (unlucky)/15 (lucky); Low: 26 
(unlucky)/13 (lucky). 
8 The difference between treatment High and treatments Medium and Low is not significant for the case of 
initially lucky outcomes (Mann-Whitney, p>0.14). However note that our number of observations is much 
smaller for „lucky‟ cases then for „unlucky‟ cases.  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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5.2. Emotions and evaluations 
We will now turn to our measures of emotions and evaluations during the experiment to 
investigate if we can find evidence for variations in emotional reactions when feedback 
and flexibility are altered. 
Because participants were required to select only one (main) emotion out of a list of 
emotion terms, we first report which emotions were chosen. Joy, hope, disappointment, 
regret and surprise are the predominantly reported emotion terms (see Table 3:A). Across 
treatments we observe that joy is more often reported in treatments Low and Medium 
(Kruskal-Wallis, p= 0.008) and that worry and irritation, has a tendency to be more often 
reported  in  treatment  High  (Kruskal-Wallis,  worry:  p=0.021;  irritation:  p=0.051). 
Grouping  emotions  dependent  on  them  generally  being  considered  to  be  negatively 
(shame, regret, irritation, worry and disappointment) or positively valenced (joy, pride 
and  hope)  gives  even  stronger  results  (see  Table  3:B)
9.  Negative  emotions  are 
significantly more often reported in treatment High ( Kruskal-Wallis, p=0.004) while 
positive  emotions are more often reported in treatments Medium and Low ( Kruskal-
Wallis, p=0.031). With respect to Hypothesis 3 we therefore conclude: 
RESULT 3:  As  myopic  loss  aversion  predicts,  aggregate  feedback  (Low)  increases 
positive emotions and decreases negative emotions. However positive emotions are also 
increased if feedback is given frequently but choices cannot be adjusted (Medium). 
Myopic loss aversion correctly predicts less negative emotional reactions when losses are 
not directly observed; however, it is not clear if emotional experience will predict future 
investment behavior. We therefore regressed investment at time t (with t=4, 7, 10 and 
13),  on  emotions  experienced  after  the  previous  block  of  three  rounds.  We  see  that 
emotions do not predict investment (see Table 4). Thus, even though emotional reactions 
are dependent on treatment, they are not related to behavior. In other words, we observe 
no interaction between emotional experience and investment behavior. 
RESULT 4: Emotional experience cannot predict future investment decisions.  
Emotions are elicited as predicted by loss aversion, however cannot explain behavior. 
Since  we  also  asked  participants  to  evaluate  their  expectations  concerning  future 
investment  rounds,  we  can  compare  the  predictive  power  of  these  evaluations  to  the 
emotional experience. We observe that evaluations concerning the future
10 (i.e. answers 
to the questions: "What are you  expectations concerning the future?" and "What is your 
confidence  in reaching  your goal?") are strongly   correlated with overall investment 
(Spearman:  +0.30;  p=0.001).  Moreover,  evaluation  of  future  events  at  time  t-1, 
significantly  predict  investment  at  time  t  (Table  6).  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
                                                 
9 We leave surprise out of this classification, since in can fall in either category. 
10 Factor analysis confirms that appraisals concerning past events and appraisa ls concerning future events 
can be represented by two separate factors (Table 5). We therefore generate two grouped variables: 
appraisal_past_events and appraisal_future_events that consist of mean values of the elements of each 
factor. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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precise interaction dynamics between emotions, evaluations, and personality we refer to 
Wranik and Hopfensitz (2008). We summarize with the following result: 
RESULT 5: Evaluations of future investment rounds can predict investment behavior in 
future rounds and are related to overall investment.  
5.3. Personality and investment 
Positive evaluations and optimism concerning the future are generally related to personal 
characteristics (Carver & Scheier, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Thus, after 
having observed that optimistic future evaluations can predict investment choices, we 
examined  the  personality  profiles  responsible  for  such  optimistic  evaluations.  Our 
hypothesis is that the personality construct of “self-efficacy”, which includes specific 
confidence in decision-making abilities, general optimism, and lack of anxiety, will result 
in more positive evaluations of the future.  
Specific confidence in decision-making abilities was measured by the question at the 
beginning of the task: "How confident are you in your ability to generally make good 
decisions?" As expected, individuals with high scores on this question also present low 
anxiety (STAI trait; Spearman: -0.546, p < 0.001) and high optimism (LOT-R; Spearman: 
0.366, p < 0.001).
11 In addition, self-efficacy is correlated with evaluations concernin g 
the future (Spearman:  +0.651,  p  <  0.000)  and  with  overall  investment.  Thus,  while 
participant scoring below mean self-efficacy (N=55) invested 45.47 points on average, 
participants above mean self-efficacy (N=59) decided to invest 60.16 points on average. 
This difference is highly significant (Mann-Whitney: p=0.006). 
Given  these  observations,  we  expected  that  individuals  with  high  self-efficacy  will 
continue  to  invest  larger  sums  in  future  rounds,  independent  of  feedback  frequency. 
Figure 5 summarizes investment for participants scoring either above mean or below 
mean self-efficacy. Participants  scoring above  mean  self-efficacy  show no behavioral 
differences for different feedback frequencies. However, we observe a strong effect of 
myopic  loss  aversion  for  participants  with  below  mean  self-efficacy  (Mann-Whitney, 
High vs. Low: p=0.049, High vs. Medium: p=0.032). This effect is amplified if we focus 
on  those  participants  who  had  initially  encountered  more  than  two  successive  losses 
(Mann-Whitney, High vs. Low: p=0.005, High vs. Medium: p=0.002).
12 
RESULT 6:  Investors  present  large  variability  in  self-efficacy,  a  personality  profile 
characterized by specific confidence in decision-making abilities, general optimism, and 
lack of anxiety. Participants with low self-efficacy show a strong reaction to feedback 
                                                 
11  In  a  debriefing  questionnaire  we  also  asked  participants  about:  (1)  their  experience  concerning 
investment; (2) their interest in investment; (3) their competence regarding mathematics and statistics and 
(4) how much they enjoy topics related to investment and finance. Positive answers to these questions are 
strongly correlated  with  high ratings concerning  'power' (Spearman, +0.33,  p<0.001). Also  men report 
higher levels of power than women (Mann-Whitney, p=0.009). 
12 However the inverse myopic loss aversion effect is not si gnificant, i.e. the difference between treatment 
High and treatments Medium and Low is not significant for the case of initially lucky outcomes (Mann -
Whitney, p>0.14). This might though be due to the reduced number of observations for this case.  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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frequency  and  flexibility  and  exhibit  characteristic  myopic  loss  aversion  behaviors. 
Participants with high scores on self-efficacy are not influenced by feedback frequency 
and flexibility and show no evidence of myopic loss aversion. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we discussed the psychological and environmental determinants of myopic 
loss aversion. We report two main results: First, myopic loss aversion is influenced by 
outcomes from early rounds of the experiment. This 'priming' effect leads to myopic loss 
aversion only when initial rounds resulted in relatively unlucky outcomes. In particular, 
aggregate feedback and reduced flexibility are obscuring losses and are only effective if 
losses are frequent. In contrast, we observe an almost reversed effect of myopic loss 
aversion when returns during initial rounds are lucky. Under conditions with reduced 
flexibility (Low), participants invest to a similar degree whether they were initially lucky 
or unlucky. In contrast, participants with detailed information about their gains and the 
option to react to them immediately (High), are motivated to invest more when they are 
initially lucky. Since other experimental studies did not control for the effect of past 
experience  on  overall  investment,  differences  across  treatments  and  studies  might  be 
partially explained by random differences in the order of gains and losses (Langer & 
Weber, forthcoming).  
Our second result concerns the psychological determinants of myopic loss aversion. We 
investigated the relation between character traits, evaluations, emotional responses, and 
investment  behavior  and  identified  a  specific  personality  profile,  self-efficacy,  which 
predicts myopic loss aversion. Self-efficacy is characterized by specific confidence in 
decision-making  abilities,  general  optimism,  and  lack  of  anxiety.  Low  self-efficacy 
participants are characterized by uncertainty and pessimism about the future, and react 
strongly  to  detailed  feedback,  especially  if  this  feedback  is  initially  negative. 
Consequently, these low self-efficacy participants profit most from aggregate feedback 
and reduced flexibility. Their investment in the risky option and hence their earnings are 
substantially higher when decisions can only be changed every three rounds. 
Evaluations  and  emotions  measured  during  the  task  are  essential  to  understand  the 
mechanisms  underlying  this  effect.  For  example,  we  observe  that  joy  is  least  often 
reported  in  the  High  treatment.  Moreover,  joy  is  significantly  higher  in  the  Medium 
treatment,  even  though  participants  witnessed  the  same  number  of  wins  in  both 
treatments.  Since  participants  can  immediately  react  to  winning  rounds  in  the  High 
treatment,  they  can also  regret  this  action afterwards,  which  could  explain the lower 
levels of joy. Finally, the larger number of joyful experiences does not predict investment 
behavior. In sum, the assumption that reduced feedback will make a risky option feel 
„better‟ is confirmed; however, this is not the driving force behind increased investment.  
Higher investment levels under reduced flexibility are mainly due to differences in how 
future events are appraised. Insecure participants show increased confidence concerning PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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future rounds when aggregate feedback is given, or if they were not allowed to react 
immediately to outcomes. This increase in confidence leads to higher investment and can 
help explain the effects of myopic loss aversion.  
Our  results  address  the  same  concept,  confidence  concerning  the  future,  with  two 
different mechanisms. Confidence is related to more frequent trades (Barber & Odean, 
2001)  and  partially  explains  why  prices  exceed  their  expected  value  (Gneezy  et  al., 
2003). Similarly, our initially lucky participants are not negatively influenced by frequent 
feedback. This is because positive feedback increases confidence about future rounds. 
However, initially unlucky periods will decrease confidence, especially when participants 
are already insecure about their abilities (e.g., low self-efficacy). This means that advisors 
must increase investor confidence if they want to increase investment in risky but high 
return options. This is especially true for those investors who are insecure and show low 
self-efficacy.  One  way  to  increase  confidence  is  to  reduce  flexibility  and  present 
aggregate feedback. However other methods might be  just as effective or even more 
effective.  For  example,  providing  potential  investors  with  detailed  information  and 
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Welcome: you are about to take part in a decision making experiment, in which you can 
earn real money. The amount of money you can earn will depend on the decisions you 
make.  
Dependent on the quality of your decisions, you can earn up to 70 CHF. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Unige Francs (UGF). At the 
end of the session, these UGF will be converted into CHF and your earnings will be paid 
out to you in CHF using the following exchange rate: 
100 UGF = 1.33 CHF 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive from us 20 CHF, which =1500 UGF. 
This is your capital stock. You can decide to either keep these UGF or to invest them in 
the experiment and try and earn more money. The details of this investment procedure 
will  be  explained  to  you  below.  At  the  end  of  the  experiment  we  will  pay  you  any 
earnings that you accumulated in addition to your 1500 UGF capital stock. If you loose 
money during the experiment, you will have to pay us back the losses from your capital 
stock at the end of the experiment. 
During the experiment we will also ask you to answer a number of questions. These 
questions concern what you think and how you feel.  
There are no right or wrong answers. You need to follow the decision strategy that feels 
right to you and to make those choices that come natural and that seem like the best 
choices for you. In addition, you should report those evaluations and emotions that are 
closest to your real thoughts and feelings. All answers are completely anonymous and 
confidential. 
Instructions 
During this experiment you will have to make investment decisions for 15 rounds. In 
each of these rounds, you can invest 100 UGF from your capital stock of 1500 UGF. 
Each round you have to decide how you want to split these 100 UGF over two investment 
options. 
We will call the two options: option A and option B. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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Option A: In this option you will neither gain nor loose money. In other words, will 
always keep the number of UGF you put into option A. 
Option B: The outcome from this option will be determined at the end of each round. In 
particular, we will pick one random number between 1 and 6. This is equivalent to rolling 
a dice. 
  If the number is 1 or 2 (that is in 1/3 of the cases) the UGF you placed in this 
option will be multiplied by 2.5. You will then receive 2.5 times the number of 
UGF you put into option B, in addition to the number of UGF you originally 
placed into this option. 
  If the number is 3, 4, 5 or 6 (that is in 2/3 of the cases) you will lose the number 
of UGF you put into option B. 
Example 
Imagine that in one round, you decide to split your 100 UGF by placing 50 UGF into 
option A and 50 UGF into option B.  
If the random number turns out to be either 1 or 2, you will receive 2.5*50 = 125, in 
addition to your 100 UGF for that round. Your capital stock will therefore increase by 
125 UGF.  
If the random number turns out to be either 3, 4, 5 or 6, you will lose the 50 UGF you put 
in option B. Your capital stock will therefore decrease by 50 UGF. 
Summary 
  In each round, you can decide how to split 100 UGF of your capital stock between 
two options.  
  At the end of each round we will pick a random number between 1 and 6. 
  If the number is 1 or 2 your earnings will be: 
100 UGF + 2.5 * the number of UGF you placed into option B 
  If the number is 3, 4, 5 or 6 your earnings will be: 
100 UGF – the number of UGF you placed into option B PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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B. Questions: 
B.1. Emotion questions: 
Which of these most closely captures your current emotional state (select one and rate 
intensity on scale from 0 to 100): 
  Shame 
  Joy 
  Regret 
  Pride 
  Irritation – anger 
  Hope 
  Worry – Anxiety  
  Surprise 
  Disappointment 
B. 2. Questions before first round: 
1. How important is it for you to do well in this task 
not at all important          very important  
 
2. How important is it for you to earn as much money as possible 
not at all important          very important 
 
3. How well do you think you will do in this task 
very poorly             very well 
 
4. Compared to the other individuals who will participate in this task, how well do you 
think that you will do 
much worse            much better 
 
5. How much money would you like to earn in this task 
I do not care             the maximum amount possible 
 
6. How confident are you in your ability to generally make good decisions 
not very confident          very confident 
 
B. 3. Appraisal questions between rounds: 
 
1. The outcome from these last three rounds is  
very negative          very positive  
 
2. The outcome from these last three rounds is  
very unfair          very fair  
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3. My performance so far is 
much worse than I expected       much better than I expected 
 
4. The outcome from these last three rounds is 
very negative for my overall goal     very positive for my overall goal 
 
5. My performance so far is caused by 
me making bad decisions      me making good decisions  
 
6. My performance so far is caused by  
extremely bad luck         extremely good luck  
 
7. In the next three rounds, I expect to do  
much worse           much better 
 
8. In my ability to reach my goal at the end of this task, I feel  
very non-confident         very confident 
 
B. 4. Questions after last round 
 
1. How important was it for you to do well in this task 
    not at all important       very important 
 
2. How important was it for you to earn as much money as possible 
    not at all important       very important 
 
3. How well do you think you did in this task 
    very poorly          very well 
 
4. How satisfied are you with the decisions you made in this task 
    very dissatisfied         very satisfied 
 
5. Compared to the other individuals who participate in this task, how well do you think 
that you did 
    much worse         much better 
 
6. Do your earnings reflect the quality of the decisions you made in this task 
    not at all           yes, absolutely 
 
7. How fair was the overall task 
    very unfair          very fair 
 
8. Do you have experience investing money in stocks or investment funds 
    no experience at all       a great deal of experience 
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9. Are you interested in finance and investment 
    not at all interested       very interested 
 
10. How competent are you in the domains of mathematics and statistics 
    very incompetent         very competent 
 
11. Do you enjoy conversations about finance and investment 
    not at all           yes, absolutely 
B. 5. Personality traits collected during first session: 
1.  STAI (anxiety) 
2.  MBSS (monitoring - blunting) 
3.  Looming scale 
4.  DERS (Difficulties in Emotion Regulation) 
5.  LOT (life orientation test) 
6.  UPPS (impulsivity: Urgency, lack of Premeditation, and Sensation Seeking) 
7.  BFI (Big five) 
8.  ERQ (Emotion Recognition Questionnaire) 
9.  ASQ (Attribution Style) 
10.  STAXI (anger) 
B. 6. Screen shot of investment screen (treatment: High): 
 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
































High (N=38) Medium (N=37) Low (N=39)
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Figure 2:  A: Histograms of average investment across treatments; B: Investment across time 































emotions:choose from: Shame, Joy, Regret, Pride, 
Irritation – anger, Hope, Worry – Anxiety, Surprise, 
Disappointment
evaluations:Relevance, Expectations, Goal setting, 
General power
emotions: (same as before)
evaluations: last three rounds: Goal obstruction, 
Discrepancy from expectation, Causality
next rounds: Expectation, Control/Power
Figure 1:  Overview of treatments and self report measures taken during experimental task.
C. Figures and Tables:
High:
mean: 50.1 (std. dev.: 27.8)
Medium:
mean: 54.2 (std. dev.: 20.6)
Low:




























Average investment across 15 rounds
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High (N=24) Medium (N=22) Low (N=26)
A.
B.
Figure 3: Investment by treatment dependent on number of gains in early rounds. A: Subjects
experiencing at most two successive losses in first six rounds. B: Subjects experiencing more
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Figure 4: Investment distribution changes from round one to round 15 dependent on experience 
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high (N=10) medium (N=11) low (N=13)
Figure 5: Investment across treatments for participants scoring above or below mean self-efficacy. 
Top twographs: all observations; bottom two graphs: only observations from participants
encountering more thantwosuccesive losses in first six rounds.  
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(N=38) (N=37) (N=39) Mann-Whitney test (p = ):





(26.20) 0.430 0.672 0.297





(30.62) 0.886 0.602 0.710





(30.37) 0.296 0.394 0.681





(33.57) 0.371 0.352 0.887





(32.81) 0.529 0.199 0.527





(26.57) 0.463 0.417 0.904
Table 1. Overview of mean investment across rounds and treatments (standard deviation in 
parenthesis).
A. more than two successive losses in first six rounds :






(N=24) (N=22) (N=26) Mann-Whitney test (p = )
invest 1-3 41.94 41.82 53.88 0.073 0.791 0.165
invest 4-6 46.68 54.14 55.04 0.381 0.332 0.992
invest 7-9 42.18 54.36 59.81 0.046 0.123 0.516
invest 10-12 40.54 61.59 52.54 0.243 0.021 0.381
invest 13-15 38.08 63.41 54.27 0.064 0.008 0.370
overall invest 41.89 55.06 55.11 0.084 0.059 0.951
B. at most two successive losses in first six rounds :






(N=14) (N=15) (N=13) Mann-Whitney test (p = )
invest 1-3 61.79 49.33 50.77 0.316 0.166 0.943
invest 4-6 59.17 54.33 46.92 0.285 0.600 0.473
invest 7-9 64.05 58.00 53.85 0.354 0.402 0.871
invest 10-12 63.69 47.33 63.46 0.865 0.149 0.195
invest 13-15 72.62 55.67 56.92 0.202 0.134 0.926
overall invest 64.26 52.93 54.38 0.423 0.138 0.596
Table 2. Overview of mean investment across rounds and treatments split for A: participants
encountering more than two successive losses in first six rounds and B: participants
encountering at most twosuccessive losses in first six rounds
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A: High (N=190) Medium (N=185) Low (N=195)
joy 12.11 % 24.32 % 28.72 %
hope 21.05 % 20.00 % 17.44 %
disappointment 16.82 % 15.68 % 15.90 %
regret 15.79 % 15.14 % 11.28 %
surprise 9.47 % 8.65 % 13.85 %
irritation 8.95 % 7.03 % 2.05 %
worry 8.42 % 3.78 % 2.05 %
pride 6.32 % 4.86 % 8.21 %
shame 1.05 % 0.54 % 0.51 %
B:
positive emotions  39.47 % 49.19 % 54.36 %
negative emotions 51.05 % 42.16 % 31.79 %
Table 3. Percentage of reported emotions across treatments.
Table 4. Random effects GLS regression of investment at time t, on different emotions 
being experienced after feedback t-1 and treatments.
R-squared:
within: 0.030 Number of observations 456
between: 0.001 number of groups 114
overall: 0.008 Prob > chi2 = 0.421
investtime t Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|
joy -10.214 11.194 0.362
hope -5.434 11.241 0.629
disappointment -9.012 11.352 0.427
regret -7.136 11.488 0.534
surprise -5.336 11.385 0.639
irritation -6.944 11.779 0.556
worry -10.998 11.776 0.350
pride -19.504 11.921 0.102
dummy_medium 2.328 6.377 0.715
dummy_low 1.528 6.313 0.809
constant 62.513 11.760 0.000
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Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
proportion of variance explained: 0.844 0.269       
positive 0.844     0.058
fair 0.441     0.242
performance 0.835     0.081
goal 0.840     0.023
decision 0.644     0.435
lucky 0.793     0.112
expect -0.166     0.624
confident 0.263     0.663
Overall KMO measure = 0.86
Table 5: Rotated factor loadings of evaluations (using Varimax rotation). Factor 1 
representing evaluations concerning past events and Factor 2 representing evaluations 
concerning future events.
Table 6: Random effects regression of investment at time t, on evaluations at t-1.
R-sq: within = 0.0098 Number of observations 570
overall = 0.0545 Number of groups 114
invest at time t Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
evaluations past (t-1) -0.017 0.011  -1.49 0.136 
evaluations future (t-1) 0.126 0.046  2.76 0.006
constant 45.890 6.673 6.88 0.000PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF MYOPIC LOSS AVERSION 
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